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COMMITTEE PRINT

THE GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT—AN APPRAISAL AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

A REPORT

PREPARED FOR THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

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FOREWORD

On behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, we are pleased to publish this report entitled, "The General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament—An Appraisal and Proposals for Change."

The General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament (GAC) was established by the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961. As Mr. Gellner notes in his report, there has been very little published information on the GAC. This research, which draws on extensive interviews with a number of past GAC chairmen, members and staff personnel, makes a substantial contribution to understanding the role of advisory bodies in the formulation of arms control policy.

In requesting the study, we noted that there have been a number of suggestions that the Congress examine ways by which more continuity could be brought to bear in our government's decisionmaking process on arms control policy. For example, in a November 13, 1981 hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee, Thomas J. Watson, former United States envoy to the Soviet Union, recommended that Congress might consider lengthening the term of office of members of the GAC to provide overlap between changes in administrations. Other possibilities for upgrading the GAC would include membership in GAC of all former ACDA directors and other former senior officials, election of the GAC chairman by its members, and more clearly specified responsibilities.

It has also been suggested that the GAC might be abolished and, possibly, replaced with an upgraded Presidential commission on arms control. Such a commission might be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, with terms overlapping changes in administrations. The commission could conceivably report directly to the President.

Accordingly, we asked that the study deal with the following:

Congress' intent in establishing the GAC;

The organization and operation of the GAC under past administrations;

The present administration's plans for the GAC; and

An outline of various proposals for reconstituting or replacing the GAC, including the pros and cons of each approach.

Although the report makes no recommendations, its assessment of the organization highlights a number of important considerations that should be taken into account in assessing possible alternatives for strengthening or replacing the GAC. We appreciate very much this important contribution by Mr. Charles R. Gellner and Ms. Judith A. Freedman.

CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman.

CLAIBORNE PELL,
Ranking Minority Member.

LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
Washington, D.C., August 16, 1982.

Hon. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am pleased to submit a study of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament and on proposals for changing it. This analysis was prepared in response to your and Senator Pell's request of December 7, 1981.

Charles R. Gellner, Senior Specialist in International Affairs, prepared the study with the assistance of Judith Freedman, Research Analyst, and Claudette Lytle, Secretary.

A significant strength of this report is that it was developed largely on the basis of interviews with persons associated with GAC. These interviews were conducted on a non-attributable basis. The published information on the General Advisory Committee is meager.

Sincerely,

GILBERT GUDE,
Director.

Enclosure.

CONTENTS

	Page
Foreword	III
Letter of submittal	V
Introduction	1
Chapter I.—Statutory authorization and purpose:	
A. Provisions of the law	3
B. Establishment of the GAC	4
Chapter II.—A brief history:	
A. The Kennedy-Johnson Administrations (1961–68)	6
B. The first Nixon Administration (1969–72)	7
C. Kissinger takes charge (1973–76)	8
D. Changes under President Carter	9
Chapter III.—Meetings and staff:	
A. Meetings of the committee	11
B. Staff and budget	13
Chapter IV.—Members: Characteristics and terms:	
A. Attributes of members	15
B. Relationships between purpose and selection of members	16
C. A hypothetical case	17
D. Should there be fixed, staggered terms?	18
Chapter V.—Access to officials and information:	
A. The President	19
B. Other officials	20
C. Proposals for improving relationships	21
D. Access to information	22
Chapter VI.—The work of the GAC:	
A. Early years	23
B. The MIRV incident	23
C. Eclipse of the committee	24
Chapter VII.—Relations with the public and with Congress:	
A. Privacy of activities	25
B. Relations with Congress	26
C. Public support of Administration policies	27
Chapter VIII.—Proposals:	
A. Senator Nunn's proposal to strengthen the GAC	29
B. Proposal by Senator Fulbright	30
C. The Watson proposal	31
D. Proposal for a National Academy for Public Policy	32
E. General observations	33
F. Problems of implementation	34
Chapter IX.—Concluding remarks	36
Appendices	39

INTRODUCTION

Under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Public Law 92–463, approved October 6, 1972) relevant committees of Congress, including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, are obligated to make a continuing review of U.S. Government advisory committees within their jurisdictions.[1] The purpose of the review is to assess the performance of such advisory committees in order to determine whether their responsibilities should be enhanced or diminished or whether they should be abolished or merged with other committees.

The General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament (GAC) is an advisory committee within the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The General Advisory Committee was established by the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961. As an oversight committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee decided that an in-depth appraisal of the work of the GAC would be appropriate.

The Committee's decision was prompted by several events. The first was the fact that, following the submission of the resignations of the members of the GAC to the newly inaugurated President, Ronald Reagan, in January 1981, almost a year and a half passed before nominations of new members were transmitted to the Senate for confirmation. The names of the nominees were forwarded on May 26, 1982. Second, certain proposals were made during that time that could, if adopted, result in enhancement or possibly replacement of the GAC. Third, important new arms control negotiations were initiated between the United States and the U.S.S.R. in regard to strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Other significant negotiations on arms control, such as those on chemical weapons, are proceeding. In addition, key arms control policy decisions have been made. It is possible that if the GAC were functioning, either in its present or another form, it could assist in the formation of government policy and positions.

The report that follows was undertaken by the Congressional Research Service at the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It is an effort to review and assess the work of the GAC during the 20 years of its existence as well as an attempt to evaluate various proposals which, if adopted, could affect its character and functions. It discusses some alternatives for amending the legislative provisions governing the GAC, but it makes no recommendations. However, without prejudging the acceptability of any changes which have been suggested, it could be logical to make amendments to the charter of the GAC before considering nominations for membership. A change in the character of the Committee could affect the types of persons to be nominated to serve on it.

[1] References will be made to this Act as "FACA" at various places in this report.

97-660 O - 82 - 2

There is little published information on the General Advisory Committee. Consequently, this report has depended heavily on interviews of about a dozen people who have been directly associated with it, including members and staff personnel. These individuals will not be identified because they provided information freely on a non-attribution basis and because they do not bear responsibility for the contents of this report.[2] Whatever they have told the author has been filtered through his own understanding, and he is solely responsible for the facts and interpretations. No access to classified information was sought or obtained in the preparation of this report. That fact has imposed some limitations on evaluating the GAC because its meetings have normally been classified.

[2] They will be referred to this report as "commentators."

Chapter I

STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION AND PURPOSE

A. Provisions of the Law

The General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament is authorized by the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961.[1] The main purpose of this act was to establish the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and to authorize its mission, organization and functions. According to the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, the President was authorized, but not directed, to appoint a General Advisory Committee (GAC). Its continuation is therefore at the option of the President. The number of members was not to exceed 15, and the President was directed to designate one of the members as chairman. The members were to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The purpose of the GAC as described in the act was to "advise the Director [of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] on arms control and disarmament policy and activities." The act additionally provided that "from time to time" the GAC "shall . . . advise the President, the Secretary of State, and the Disarmament Director respecting matters affecting arms control, disarmament, and world peace." It appears that the GAC was intended to have a continuing function of advising the Director of ACDA on arms control and disarmament policy and activities, but only an intermittent responsibility to advise the President, the Secretary of State, and the Disarmament Director on matters "affecting arms control, disarmament, and world peace."

The first, continuing function appears to be directly related to the policy formulation and other activities of ACDA itself. The second function appears to be more broadly conceived in that the GAC is directed to advise the President and the Secretary of State, in addition to the Director of ACDA, who have more far-reaching responsibilities in regard to the foreign relations of the United States. It is also more broadly framed to embrace "matters affecting" not only arms control and disarmament but also "world peace." The last term could span a large spectrum of subjects.

That is the profile of the GAC as provided in the original legislation. No amendments have since been made to this provision.

[1] Public Law 87–297, 75 Stat. 631 approved September 26, 1961.

B. Establishment of the GAC[2]

The roots of the GAC lie in the Presidential campaign of 1960. John F. Kennedy, during the campaign, had voiced strong support for a positive arms control policy and a new Government organization to administer it. After he was elected he appointed John J. McCloy, a prominent conservative Republican, as his Adviser on Disarmament with a mandate to head a campaign to obtain legislation establishing a new arms control agency. McCloy possessed unassailable credentials as an American of high achievement inside Government and out, a man of sound judgment and of "establishment" philosophy. He had been Assistant Secretary of War during World War II, U.S. High Commissioner in Germany, Chairman of the Board of the Chase Manhattan Bank, Chairman of the Ford Foundation and President of the World Bank.

President Kennedy wanted a person of his solid qualities to be in charge of arms control matters in his administration partly because it was a subject that was looked upon askance by some Americans as threatening to national security and military defense. Moreover, some Americans thought the subject was a favorite of visionaries, unrealistic religionists, do-gooders and ivory-tower scientists, and that the proposed arms control agency would be a refuge for such people.[3] This factor loomed importantly in President Kennedy's management of his arms control policy, and of his efforts to create a new agency. He wanted a person like McCloy to give them an image of soundness and acceptability.[4]

The atmosphere of suspicion regarding the new Arms Control and Disarmament Agency inspired directly the idea of a General Advisory Committee. It was to be a kind of watchdog over the new agency to help keep it in line. The idea came from somewhere in Congress—although where is obscure—but it was in the legislation proposed by the Kennedy Administration in June 1961, which was shepherded through Congress by McCloy.

At one time some thought that McCloy would become the head of the agency he step-fathered. However, it turned out that he decided

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[2] The history of the GAC in this and the following chapter is not intended to be definitive. It leans in part on Duncan Clarke's excellent account in "Politics of Arms Control," 1979, Chapter 10; the Annual Reports of ACDA; miscellaneous unpublished documents; and interviews.

[3] Regarding the proposed agency, Robert A. Lovett, former Secretary of Defense, testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

> . . . an agency of this extraordinary power, with its very wide-ranging activities—in fact, one that gets into the most sensitive areas of most of our agencies—should require something more than the normal security checks.
>
> This would be almost an ideal place for subversives to attempt to infiltrate . . . it seems clear to me that this is going to be a Mecca for a wide variety of screwballs. It will be a natural magnet for those rather uninspiring groups that have slogans, "Better Red Than Dead," "Surrender and Survive," or the give-up groups. I do not think that this is a vain worry; I think it is quite real. This will attract a considerable group of people whose purposes are not those of the sincere and experienced individual who has a profound belief in this Agency's purpose and who is a loyal Government servant.
>
> It would be a great pity to have this Agency launched and shortly become known as a sort of bureau of beatniks. We would then get a substantial number of people applying or trying to infiltrate precisely because these are extremely sensitive areas covered by the broad powers of this Agency. [*Disarmament Agency, Hearings . . .*, 1961, p. 87.]

Mr. Lovett later became a member of the GAC.

[4] Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., "A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House," 1965, p. 472.

to return to his law practice. William C. Foster, who had much of the same Government-business background and solid "establishment" Republican image as McCloy,[5] was appointed as head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and McCloy was appointed head of the new General Advisory Committee. From this latter vantage point, it was thought he could oversee the fledgling Government organization.

The oversight role of the GAC was implied in its principal legislative mission to "advise the Director [of ACDA] on arms control and disarmament policy *and activities*".[6] Both William Foster and the Agency adopted a conservative attitude from the beginning. This prevented ACDA—as a Government organization—from making any egregious missteps. The Agency soon established its respectability. In terms of exercising minute oversight over details of ACDA organization, procedures or actions, the GAC was in no position to do so, and McCloy evidently had no desire to do so anyway. From the time the GAC was reconstituted under the first Nixon Administration the oversight functions of the GAC were jettisoned. The Advisory Committee from the beginning was mainly, and after 1969 solely a *policy* advisory body.

[5] Foster had been Administrator of the U.S. Foreign Aid Program, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Executive Vice President of Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.
[6] Italic supplied.

Chapter II

A BRIEF HISTORY

A. The Kennedy-Johnson Administrations (1961–1968)

The original members of the GAC appointed by President Kennedy were sworn in on April 2, 1962 and John J. McCloy was designated chairman. It is reasonable to assume that the selection of members of the GAC was made at least in part at the instance of John J. McCloy who was such a key figure in arms control matters in the Kennedy Administration.

During the Kennedy-Johnson years the membership of the committee was maintained at or close to the legal limit of 15 members. Because of death and resignation, during these years a total of 19 members served at one time or another on the GAC. As discussed later, the professional backgrounds of the members of the GAC are relevant for an appraisal of their ability to carry out its mission.

In addition to McCloy the other members were Roger Blough, chairman of the board of U.S. Steel; Rev. Edward Conway, professor at Creighton University; John Cowles, publisher and editor; Trevor Gardner, former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force and industrial executive; George Kistiakowsky, professor of chemistry at Harvard and former Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; Robert A. Lovett, former Under Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense; Dean A. McGee, president of Kerr-McGee Oil Industries; Ralph McGill, editor, Atlanta Constitution; George Meany, president of AFL–CIO; James Perkins, vice president of Carnegie Corporation; Herman Phleger, lawyer and former Legal Adviser of the State Department; I. I. Rabi, professor of physics, Columbia University, and former Chairman of the President's Science Advisory Committee; General Thomas White, former Air Force Chief of Staff; Herbert York, Chancellor of the University of California, and former Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense.

In addition to weighing certain political factors, Lyndon Johnson probably consulted with both McCloy and Foster before making the four additional appointments. These were General Alfred Gruenther, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe; Troy Post, president, Great America Corp.; Stephen Wright, executive director, United Negro College Fund, Inc.; and Maurine Neuberger, professor at Radcliffe and former U.S. Senator from Oregon.

The inclusion of a black and a female among the members was repeated later by the Carter Administration.

During these 7 years the GAC performed in an advisory capacity to the Director of ACDA. He convened it, set the agenda and was the principal Government official who met with it. Meetings were held about four times a year.

B. The First Nixon Administration (1969–1972)

After President Nixon entered office in 1969 he revised the role of the General Advisory Committee. The President accepted the resignations of all the members of the GAC except that of the chairman, John J. McCloy. McCloy proposed that, if the GAC was to perform an influential function, it should be given a new independent status. The President agreed and decided that the GAC should be reconstituted on the model of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. This meant, in effect, that it would be principally an advisory body to the President and would be independent of the Secretary of State, the Director of ACDA, or any other official. The President formally reconstituted the GAC on June 5, 1969.

Legally the terms under which the GAC was reconstituted radically changed its functions as these had been originally stipulated under the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. As noted above, that Act specified that the committee was mainly advisory to the Director of ACDA although it possessed occasional responsibilities to give advice to the President and the Secretary of State. In practice, it had operated almost entirely as an advisory body to the Director of ACDA. It is debatable whether the revamped GAC operated fully in accordance with the terms of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, terms which admittedly are not precisely framed and which in any case leave it to the option of the President whether or not he will appoint a GAC.

President Nixon nominated John J. McCloy as chairman, plus 14 new members. This wholesale turnover in membership has been repeated twice since then and President Reagan, judging by the nominations he has made, intends to do it again.

To support its new status, the committee was given a separate staff and permanent quarters in the Department of State building. While the committee directed its advice solely to the President, copies of written memos to the President were usually provided to the Secretary of State and the Director of ACDA, whence they filtered down to other officials. Allegedly, copies were not provided the Department of Defense. It became obvious during the 2 years after it was reconstituted that the GAC performed a more significant role than it did earlier.

The members of the GAC appointed by President Nixon at the beginning of the second period were similar in character to those appointed under Kennedy and Johnson.[7] A possible exception was that there was more of a Republican cast to the group appointed by President Nixon. The distinguished public servant and the solid citizen type of image was maintained. At least three of the well known Republican public servants on the list had also had distinguished Government service under Democratic Presidents—Douglas Dillon, William C. Foster, and John J. McCloy. The 15 members appointed by Nixon were as follows:

John J. McCloy—his reappointment as chairman provided significant continuity to the committee; I. W. Abel, president of the United Steel Workers of America; Dr. Harold Brown, scientist, president of the California Institute of Technology, member of the SALT Delegation, and former Secretary of the Air Force; William J. Casey,

[7] An analysis of the kinds of people appointed to the GAC is made in Chapter IV.

author, editor, and lawyer; William C. Foster, former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Kermit Gordon, president of the Brookings Institution, former member of the Council of Economic Advisers, and Director of the Bureau of the Budget; Dr. James R. Killian, chairman of the corporation of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, former Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; General Lauris Norstad, USAF (Ret.), chairman of the board and president of the Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation, former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SHAPE); Dr. Jack Ruina, professor of electrical engineering at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, former president, Institute for Defense Analyses, and Assistant Director for Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense; Dean Rusk, professor of international law, University of Georgia, former Secretary of State; Governor William Scranton, lawyer, former Governor of Pennsylvania, and Member of Congress; Cyrus Vance, lawyer, former Deputy Secretary of Defense; Dr. John Archibald Wheeler, scientist, Joseph Henry Professor of Physics at Princeton.

Mr. C. Douglas Dillon resigned from the committee in 1970 and three other members—William J. Casey, Peter Peterson and Cyrus Vance—resigned in 1971. To fill the vacancies caused by these four resignations the President made five nominations during the years 1971 and 1972 which were referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

The nomination of George Smathers was referred to the committee in September 1971 and withdrawn the following month. This aborted nomination was evidently not related to those which followed. The names of Earle G. Wheeler, John McCone and Robert Ellsworth were referred to the Senate Committee in 1971 which considered and returned them to the President at the end of the session. They were referred during the second session and returned to the President a second time upon the adjournment of that session. The name of David Packard was nominated and considered by the committee in 1972 but was also returned to the President upon adjournment of Congress that year.

The Foreign Relations Committee never issued any statement why it had failed to approve any of these nominees. Senator J. William Fulbright told the Senate in October 1972 that the Foreign Relations Committee had refused to approve four nominees to an advisory committee "on the basis of principle." He did not further explain.[8] The conservative viewpoints of the individuals concerned and their presumably anti-arms control tendencies could have been the grounds for disqualifying them.

C. Kissinger Takes Charge (1973–1976)

The SALT I agreements went into force in October 1972.[9] In November, President Richard Nixon was reelected to a second term. For reasons which cannot be detailed here, there was a severe reaction in

[8] Congressional Record, October 14, 1972: S18316.

[9] SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks). The purpose of the agreements, concluded by the United States and the U.S.S.R., was to limit certain offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapons.

some political quarters against the SALT I agreements and in favor of a sterner U.S. stance in future strategic arms control negotiations. Under this political pressure, the Nixon Administration made changes in organs of the executive branch identified with the SALT I agreements. There was a wholesale purge of the top echelons of ACDA. Fred Ikle, a non-governmental defense specialist not known for pro-arms control sentiments, succeeded Gerard Smith as Director of ACDA. The Agency was downgraded in executive policymaking.

As part of this shake-up, the GAC was left vacant for more than a year. It did not function during 1973 and did not meet again until August 1974. By that time Harold Agnew, director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, which was engaged in the development of nuclear weapons, was made chairman. At this time Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State and held in his hands the negotiating reins of the resumed SALT meetings. During 1973, President Nixon was increasingly implicated in the Watergate events. He was succeeded by President Ford in 1974.

Kissinger picked Agnew, commentators have said, because he did not want to be challenged seriously in regard to his arms control policies. Agnew, who was highly competent in his professional subject—the design of nuclear weapons, did not have the background of traditional arms controllers. The GAC became less influential during these years. Nevertheless, during this time the GAC had a distinguished membership and engaged in an ambitious self-educational schedule.

The members included I. W. Abel, president, United Steel Workers; Gordon Allott, former Senator from Colorado; Harold Brown, president of Caltech and former Secretary of the Air Force; Edward Clark, banker and former Ambassador to Australia; William C. Foster, former Director of ACDA; Lane Kirkland, AFL–CIO; John McCone, former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission and former Director, CIA; Carl Marcy, former staff director, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Joseph Martin, U.S. Representative in arms control negotiations; Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State; William Scranton, former Member of Congress and Governor of Pennsylvania; Gerard Smith, former Director of ACDA; John Wheeler, professor of physics at Princeton; and James Chambers, president, Dallas Times Herald.[10]

Five of these members were reappointments from the first Nixon administration. The group had not only distinguished careers but considerable expertise in arms control and national security matters, as well as being representative of various public interests.

D. Changes Under President Carter

With the advent of the administration of President Carter, another rotation in membership occurred. This brought some changes in the character of the GAC. In contrast with previous groups of members, there were no ex-officials of the State Department, Defense Department and ACDA. (Later, in 1980, George Seignious, former Director of ACDA, was added to the committee.) The group had much more of

[10] Scranton and Smith resigned in 1976. Chambers was confirmed in 1976.

a business, labor, lawyer and scientist coloration. Two were women, one of whom was a black. The members, at least at first, possessed less arms control and national security expertise than earlier committees had. They included as chairman, Thomas J. Watson, Jr., chairman of the board of IBM; Harold M. Agnew; McGeorge Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation; Bert Combs, former Governor of Kentucky; L. Owen Cooper, former president of the Southern Baptist Convention; Paul Doty, director of the Program for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University; Douglas Fraser, president of the United Auto Workers of America; Harry Huge, attorney; Lane Kirkland, Secretary-Treasurer, later president of the AFL–CIO; Arthur B. Krim, attorney; Wolfgang Panofsky, director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center; Brent Scowcroft, former assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and Margaret Bush Wilson, chairman of the NAACP.

Later Jame Cahill Pfeiffer, chairman of the board of NBC, joined the committee.

The new chairman, Thomas Watson, Jr., had no special background in Government service or in national security matters but was a prominent and successful business executive. He brought much skill, enthusiasm and sincerity to the post, and became an ardent believer in the urgent necessity of achieving nuclear arms control. Under his guidance the committee stepped up its tempo and for the most part held meetings once a month.

In 1979, President Carter appointed Watson U.S. Ambassador to Moscow. McGeorge Bundy succeeded to the chairmanship of the GAC. In 1980, arms control negotiations slumped. Bundy did not see the need of meeting as often under Watson and somewhat reduced the frequency of sessions.

With the defeat of President Carter in 1980, all the members of the GAC resigned. On May 26, 1982, President Reagan transmitted to the Senate for confirmation the names of 12 nominees. Subsequently he submitted the names of two additional nominees.[11]

[11] The names of the 14 nominees are listed in Appendix G.

Chapter III

MEETINGS AND STAFF

A. Meetings of the Committee

The Arms Control and Disarmament Act specified that the GAC should meet at least twice a year.

During the Kennedy-Johnson period, the GAC was convened by the Director of ACDA, William C. Foster, for 25 meetings, that is, about four times a year (1962–1968). Each meeting typically lasted a day and a half and included items such as the following:

(1) A report on current negotiations;

(2) A briefing on some military, political or economic subject, such as an explanation of a weapon system, or a situation in some area of the world;

(3) An explanation of a policy or program, such as U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy, or an agency research program;

(4) Administrative matters, such as a reorganization within ACDA or congressional hearings and appropriations.

Questions and discussions followed in which members of the GAC might express views or make suggestions. Usually some time was scheduled for closed sessions which only the members of the GAC and the Director attended. These private sessions allowed opportunity for frank exchanges with the Director, who might have heard viewpoints otherwise not expressed. A number of high officials, including the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with the Committee.[12] In addition, many lesser officials briefed and discussed with the GAC such matters as listed above.

Following the reconstitution of the GAC and the de facto change in its terms of reference in 1969, it became mainly an advisory committee to the President. It held meetings much more frequently and performed a much more substantial advisory function in regard to the President, the Director of ACDA and other principal Government officials. This coincided with a shift in the locus of arms control policymaking in the Government to the White House and the National Security Council. Whereas during the Kennedy-Johnson years the GAC was a relatively minor and passive consulting body for the Director of ACDA, under the Nixon Presidency and the reinvigorated chairmanship of John J. McCloy the GAC pursued an active self-education and creative policy function. The number of meetings held by the reconstituted GAC is told in the following table:

[12] Meetings with the President are discussed in Chapter V.

Year:	Number of meetings
1969	3
1970	18
1971	11
1972	10

During these years the committee brought in many official and unofficial authorities to exchange information and ideas and to receive briefings and advice. ACDA Annual Reports state that more than 200 authorities ranging from Government officials such as the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of ACDA, the Director of CIA, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and many other subordinate officials. In addition many academic and other professional authorities met with the committee.

It is stated in the Annual Reports of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency that the President commissioned the GAC to study various aspects of SALT and of various other arms control matters and to provide him with advice on these matters. The GAC ranged over a wide variety of arms control subjects and other matters relating to the international strategic balance. Because the meetings of the committee were closed and frequently dealt with classified matters there is virtually no public information. with one notable exception described later, on the specifics of its deliberations and on the advice it gave the President. the Director of ACDA and other officials.

After the Presidential elections of 1972, Mr. McCloy and the other members of the committee, as was customary for such officials, submitted their resignations to the President. The President never accepted or rejected the resignations. McCloy allegedly considered himself to have resigned. The staff assigned to the GAC was dispersed.

In 1973 the GAC was in limbo because no members had been appointed. In 1974 the GAC resumed activity after new members had been appointed and continued to function until the Carter Administration began in January 1977. Meetings were held as follows:

Year	Number	Information
1974	3	1st meeting held in August.
1975	5	2 days each including 1 meeting at laboratories in Los Alamos and Albuquerque.
1976	5	2 days each.

Before President Carter was inaugurated, this group held another meeting on January 6, 1977. Since the Carter Administration did not get the GAC going again for more than a year, there were no more meetings in 1977. Then meetings were held as follows:

Year	Number	Information
1978	9	The meetings started in March and were held once a month, 2 days each.
1979	12	Once a month, usually 2 days each.
1980	7	About every 2 months, 2 days each.

During recent years (1975–1980), the subjects on which the GAC had discussions and briefings included the SALT Treaty and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations, negotiations on the Threshold and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Bans, the proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission, many aspects of the problem of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, negotiations on antisatellite systems and chemical weapons, and activities of the United Nations regarding arms control. Other subjects have included various weapon systems including the MX ICBM, military capabilities of foreign countries including the Soviet Union and China, and the strategic balance between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Some meetings involved field visits to military sites. Meetings in October 1978 were held at SAC Headquarters, Omaha, Nebraska, and at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota. The January 1979 meeting included visits to weapons laboratories in Los Alamos and Albuquerque, New Mexico.

B. Staff and Budget

The Federal Advisory Committee Act stipulates that the legislation establishing an advisory committee make provisions for its staffing and other forms of support. The clauses in the Arms Control and Disarmament Act on the GAC do not make any provision on this point. In practice, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has provided the funds, housing and staffing support for the operations of the GAC. The most recently available estimate of the annual expenses of the GAC is that made in early 1981 which calls for an annual budget of $210,000. This would include mainly the expenses of the members in attending meetings of the GAC and the income of professional and secretarial staff for the GAC. Generally speaking, in recent years the GAC has had one professional staff assistant, called executive director, and one secretary. From comments received, it appears that this amount of staff support is sufficient for the GAC as it has performed in recent years.

During the first 7 years, when the GAC acted mainly as an advisory body to the Director of ACDA, it did not have any staff or quarters of its own.

Then the focus of the GAC was changed in 1969 to that of a Presidential advisory committee. To support its independent and expanded operations the GAC was assigned a small permanent professional and secretarial staff which was established in offices assigned to the GAC in the Department of State building. The staff of the GAC during this period consisted of two to three professionals plus secretaries. It was under the direction of Chairman McCloy and had no administrative connection with either ACDA or the Department of State, although at least some of the staff was from those agencies.

The committee then had an annual budget of about $125,000, contributed from ACDA appropriations, which covered the staff salaries, travel of committee members, et cetera. The budget gradually increased over the years to its present programmed level—$210,000. Actual expenditures have varied with the activities of the committee.

After the GAC was reconstituted in 1974, it had one professional staff person plus secretarial help. With one significant exception staff support has remained at that level. In 1976, ACDA withdrew the full-time professional staff person, a Foreign Service officer, allegedly because the GAC was not sufficiently reflective of ACDA viewpoints at that time. The incident, while an isolated one, demonstrates the anomaly of supporting a Presidential advisory committee through the budget of ACDA instead of through the White House or some other budget.

An additional source of staffing support to the GAC is that it has been able to obtain briefing papers and other kinds of informational assistance from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of State and other Government agencies.

If the GAC is strengthened or changed, then it might be desirable to sever its identification with ACDA. The fact that the GAC receives virtually all of its material support from that Agency, and that the reports it makes according to the terms of the FACA are issued under the aegis of ACDA tends to reenforce its image of identification with that Agency.

But if, and this has been proposed by some former members of the GAC, it is converted to a "White House" committee, this would imply that it would receive its material and administrative support from, and be otherwise identified with, the Executive Office of the President.

Chapter IV

MEMBERS: CHARACTERISTICS AND TERMS

A. Attributes of Members

There was a consensus among commentators that members of the GAC should possess attributes equal to those found in officials at the highest levels of the Government or of American life. They should be distinguished by sound judgment and commonsense with a profound grasp of foreign policy or of public policy issues. Many, not necessarily all, should have had distinguished Government service in high office in the national security subject area (foreign policy, defense, intelligence, arms control) or should have eminence in science, business, labor, or academic areas. Many stressed that the group should be politically bipartisan.

There was some belief among commentators that the members of the GAC originally appointed by President Kennedy came closest to meeting the ideal criteria. During the Kennedy-Johnson period the members of the committee were generally selected from high prestige ranks of business, industry, former or retired military and State Department officials, and also included representatives of academic, labor and other communities. It was clear that members were selected to convey an image of high professional accomplishment, of sober intelligence, of consensual, nonradical political viewpoints, of unquestionable loyalty and concern for the security of the United States, and of sound judgment in regard to the means of assuring the realization of national security goals of the United States. Many of the members, tended to be associated with what is vaguely known as the "establishment." They included both well-known Democrats and Republicans but generally those of centrist views.

There was also some belief that there had been a few departures from these criteria in subsequent appointments. For instance, subsequent groups possessed somewhat less expertise in national security matters, at least when first appointed. Somewhat more stress was also laid on "political reward" factors and on representation of minority groups.

However, if somewhat different criteria were followed in certain instances in later groups, that could not be a valid reason for disparaging them. There have not been, in fact, great differences among them. For instance, a British journalist was struck by the outstanding qualities of the group that entered in 1969. He called them "ornaments of the American establishment" and "the flower of American civilization." His lyrical and enthusiastic description might have been applied just as aptly to groups both before and after.[13]

[13] Louis Heren, in a book entitled "No Hail, No Farewell," 1970. Excerpts are included in Appendix A. Mr. Heren was American editor of the London Times.

B. Relationships Between Purpose and Selection of Members

Selection of members has a close relation to what is conceived to be the purposes of the GAC and how seriously the President and the officials of his administration accept these purposes.

The first purpose to be considered is whether the GAC should be primarily advisory to the Director of ACDA, as the original legislation intended. Second, should it be primarily advisory to the President as it was redirected after 1969? Third, should it be mainly advisory to leading national security officials (Secretary of State, Director of ACDA, Secretary of Defense)? Fourth, should it be employed chiefly as a seat of honor or a convenient parking place for individuals chosen for some political purpose? Fifth, should it have a mission of informing or guiding the public?

Having settled on purposes for the GAC—and it might be some combination of those enumerated—then there could be a choice between (A) selecting members with a spectrum of viewpoints, deliberately chosen to expose the President and other high officials to ideas, arguments or prejudices flowing from a variety of political, economic, social or other interests not necessarily in harmony with their views or (B) selecting members with views congenial to the President or his administration primarily on the grounds that such advisers would be heeded and would not cause contention or tension such as evidently occurred between the GAC and the White House during the first Nixon Administration.

Another important choice could be between (A) members with leadership experience in Government national security responsibilities, including arms control and defense, such as a former Secretary of Defense or Director of ACDA; (B) members with broad experience in public life, such as ex-governors or ex-Congressmen; (C) members with leading positions in non-governmental economic or social life, such as business executives, labor leaders, and editors or other media representatives; and (D) members from certain interest groups.

Another possible subdivision of categories above could be (A) executives; (B) technicians with arms control, national security or other expertise; and (C) those selected as a political reward or for political benefit. These three subdivisions can each contribute something distinctive. Executives can bring wide vision and authority not otherwise available in the Government. Technicians can supply subject knowledge and accuracy, and shield the group from charges of amateurism or ignorance. Political selectees can add acceptability.

This catalog is not intended to cover all possible alternatives. In the membership groups thus far there have been varying mixes. An individual might often combine characteristics of several categories. No attempt will be made here to analyze in detail all the membership groups that have made up the GAC.[14] Experience has shown, more-

[14] As an example, a brief breakdown of the members appointed in 1969 could be as follows:

Officials with knowledge of Department of Defense matters: Harold Brown, Lauris Norstad, J. P. Ruina and Cyrus R. Vance. William C. Foster and John J. McCloy also had posts in the Department of Defense but they more pertinently could be described as representing the arms control experience on the committee. The following possessed

over, that the composition of each group is not necessarily a guide to the success of its relationship with an administration.

C. A Hypothetical Case

There was an unofficial and unconfirmed report published late in 1981 listing people that the Reagan Administration planned to nominate for the GAC.[15] Without knowing the reliability or accuracy of this report, it was used as a hypothetical case to solicit an appraisal from the commentators. As it later turned out, the 12 nominations made by President Reagan in May 1982 had all been listed in the unofficial report. The only exception was William Van Cleave, as described below.[16]

There was virtual unanimity among the commentators that the membership of the GAC as contemplated in the published report would constitute a sharp departure from past criteria. The alleged nominees would for the most part represent a focused ideological viewpoint, not a spectrum of views, and would largely be defense-type ex-officials, analysts, or technicians, not high-level statesmen and citizens with broad and varied backgrounds who possessed a good grasp of foreign policy and other relevant public issues.

One explanation offered why this particular group was selected was that the Reagan Administration felt some obligation toward them, but did not wish to, or was unable to include them in regular Government posts.

Subsequently the press reported that the Administration had rejected William Van Cleave as chairman. Van Cleave, often characterized as a "hard-liner," last fall had criticized publicly the President's decision on deploying the MX ICBM. Van Cleave was reported as saying that Edwin Meese 3d, counselor to President Reagan, had told him his selection as chairman was reversed because of his opposition to the MX decision.[17]

It is acknowledged that other, undisclosed reasons might better explain the dismissal of Van Cleave. Nevertheless, if agreement with the President's defense decisions or political loyalty are now accepted as requirements for GAC membership, then this runs counter to the belief of most commentators that a spectrum of views should characterize the GAC and that one of its chief values is to permit Administration officials to hear different, even conflicting ideas.

Some commentators objected to a committee heavily populated with analysts and technicians on the grounds that this offers the President

a broad background of diplomatic experience: Douglas Dillon and Dean Rusk. Economic expertise of various kinds was represented by William J. Casey, Kermit Gordon, Peter Peterson, and to some extent I. W. Abel, who also could bring to bear a labor point of view. James R. Killian, J. P. Ruina, John Archibald Wheeler, and also Harold Brown had scientific background and could provide a scientific input to the considerations of the committee. William Scranton and Cyrus Vance, provided a legal component that could be useful in the deliberations of the committee. Probably the most "political" were William J. Casey, who was a prominent Republican lawyer who had assisted Nixon in a previous Presidential campaign and William Scranton, who at one time had been a prominent candidate for the Republican Presidential nomination. In short, the committee represented a wide variety of political, diplomatic, defense, legal, economic and other factors all of which could be of significance in dealing with arms control matters. One might note, however, the absence of religious and minority members such as served during the Kennedy-Johnson years.

[15] Foreign Affairs Report, November 1981. See text in Appendix B.

[16] The two nominations made in June and August 1982, by President Reagan were not in the unofficial report.

[17] New York Times, January 30, 1982 and February 2, 1982.

and other high administration officials nothing in the way of advice that they cannot readily get in other ways. The Government has in its employ numerous technicians who can be called upon and it also has funds to hire outside technicians as consultants, if necessary.

D. Should There Be Fixed, Staggered Terms?

One of the questions raised in recent proposals [18] is whether membership on the GAC should be for fixed terms. The presumption is that the terms of service might extend, for example, for 6 or 8 years and would be staggered so that the group would not all terminate at one time, such as at a change in administrations.

Reaction of commentators to this proposal was mixed. Some saw possible advantages in fixed terms. Some saw no advantage or even disadvantage.

(1) *Advantages.*—Fixed, staggered terms would be intended to prevent the resignations of the total membership with each change in the Presidency. It can be seen from the accompanying chart that the customary pattern has been one of total turnover of personnel with each new President and in one case with the reelection of a President (Nixon).[19] This has resulted, in the eyes of some, in a damaging loss of experience and expertise after a valuable learning process has occurred. New members must in many instances repeat the learning process, often from ground zero. Since the same kind of changeover of personnel often occurs in the top levels of Government with a new administration, there is a damaging loss of continuity of knowledge and policy. This is a major weakness in the U.S. foreign policy structure. If the GAC could provide some continuity, this might offset to some extent the loss of continuity in the Government proper. It could help act as a bridge between administrations which a successor administration could find useful.

(2) *Disadvantages.*—On the other hand, some have contended, a President must have members on the GAC in whom he has confidence, regardless of their capabilities and qualifications, or he will not seek their advice.[20] One commentator said there must be a certain "chemistry" between the President and his advisers, or the desired interaction does not occur. Unless the members of GAC are "his" men, not the men of an earlier President, a President will not be disposed to resort to them.

The cogency of this last factor has been acknowledged by some advocates of the fixed term. They suggest that in any case the chairman of the GAC should be appointed by the President then in office.

It is obvious that the character of the membership of the GAC would have much to do with its acceptability by a successor President. If it is bipartisan and represents a broad spectrum of viewpoints and groups, a President who inherited them might be more likely to find some of the members more congenial than if they were selected according to narrow standards.

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[18] See Chapter VIII.
[19] See Appendix C.
[20] See Chapter V. for a discussion of "access" to the President

Chapter V

ACCESS TO OFFICIALS AND INFORMATION

A. The President

One key factor whereby to measure the usefulness of the GAC has been its access to the President and to other high Government officials. The term "access" in this context refers in the first instance to the ability of the committee to make its recommendations known to the President and other relevant officials. In the second instance it involves the capability of obtaining information from any officials or from any source relevant to the committee's work. This applies especially to classified information regarding matters taken up by the committee.

The access of the committee to the President on those occasions when it might have wished to make recommendations to him over the 20-year life of the GAC has been erratic. First of all the usefulness of the committee to the President has depended on the President's assessment of the possibility that the committee has something of value to tell him. With some Presidents, this assessment of the committee has been low.

It has also depended greatly on the personal relationship between the President and the chairman of the committee. It is well known that the relationship between President Kennedy and John J. McCloy, the first chairman of the GAC, was close. But this relationship was between two people and not between the President and the GAC. The latter during the Kennedy-Johnson era was looked upon, according to its statute, as a body which principally advised the Director of ACDA. President Kennedy met with the committee on only two occasions, the first being the day it was sworn in [21] But he often did business with McCloy. For instance, he entrusted McCloy with a number of diplomatic missions.

On the other hand, McCloy did not have this personal relationship with Presidents Johnson and Nixon.

After President Kennedy, the record of contacts between the President and the GAC was as follows:

> President Johnson did not pay the committee much mind and never met with it.
>
> Nixon met twice with the GAC [22] but never with McCloy who tried often to see him. However, McCloy met with the National Security Council at least twice when strategic arms negotiations were on the agenda.

[21] April 2, 1962 and April 9, 1963.
[22] December 16, 1969 and March 21, 1972.

President Ford evidently met once with the GAC but Chairman Agnew was not close to him. Agnew himself was active as an individual and consulted with Ikle. However, Ikle evidently had little regard for the committee and reportedly sought at one time to abolish it. During the last year of the Ford Administration he withdrew from the committee its full-time professional staff assistant.

President Carter met once with the GAC [23] and with Chairman Watson possibly a half dozen times. Chairman Bundy never met with President Carter.

B. Other Officials

However, the importance of personal access to the President can be exaggerated. It is more meaningful for communications from the GAC to get to the President and to officials who are close to the President and would normally be expected to make known in some way the views of the committee to the President. These officials include the National Security Adviser, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It can be said that the committee, in a number of instances, had good relationships with these officials.

Because of the closeness of the National Security Adviser to the President, the relationship between him and the committee has sometimes been of particular significance. It has fluctuated over the years. In some cases the National Security Adviser sought to control communication between the GAC and the President. Because of this phenomenon, as described earlier, the relationship of the GAC with the White House deteriorated during the first Nixon Administration when Henry Kissinger was National Security Adviser. This was partly responsible for the hiatus in the existence of the committee in 1973.

During this administration, the committee tried to counteract negative influence from the National Security Adviser on its communications to the President. Messages were addressed to the President with information copies to the Secretary of State and the Director of ACDA (not to the Secretary of Defense) and sometimes sent by an alternative route to avoid the National Security Adviser.

In the second Nixon Administration when Henry Kissinger became Secretary of State and wished to concentrate authority in that office, this led to less emphasis on the committee as far as relations with top leaders in the Administration were concerned.

There was a rebound during the Carter Presidency. Then relations between the committee and the President and other senior officials became reasonably helpful again.

Under the Reagan Administration the committee has not yet been officially reconstituted.

In general, commentators concurred that access to high officials, except for the President, has usually been good or at least satisfactory.

[23] December 14, 1978

C. Proposals for Improving Relationships

Many commentators concurred that the existence of an unhampered line of communication between the President and the GAC, especially the chairman of the GAC, or between officials who are close to the President and the GAC, is a critical touchstone of the committee's success. It is a key standard to be met in order to justify the continuance of the GAC. This does not mean that at every instant the GAC and the President, or his official associates, should have a close working relationship with the GAC. One commentator observed that it is a normal expectation in the real world that relationships between an administration and a body like the GAC will vary, that sometimes they will be poor or nonexistent and at other times be comparatively good and advantageous. It could be valid to preserve the GAC during the poor times so that it is available, alive and well, during the auspicious times.

A number of devices have been suggested to foster a better relationship between the GAC on the one hand and the President and administration officials on the other. One suggestion has been to place a requirement in the law for the President to meet with the GAC. Whether or not there is a legislative requirement, it could be a salutary practice for the President to have a closed session with the committee, say for a couple of hours several times a year, with no one else present—no advisers, no staff, perhaps no record keeping—for a free and frank exchange of opinions and ideas on arms control policy and related subjects. This would resurrect for the President's benefit the type of intimate meeting the GAC held with the Director of ACDA in its earliest years. The privacy of the meeting could encourage these attending to an uninhibited exchange that could expose the President to ideas not generated by the regular Federal bureaucracy.

Another proposal has been that the GAC be required to make formal reports periodically to the President. Conversely, it has been proposed that the President and the top department and agency officials should take more initiative themselves in referring issues, proposals and other suitable matters to the GAC for a reaction.

Some Annual Reports by ACDA state that the President and executive officials referred matters to the GAC for its reactions. Presidents have also referred tasks to other advisory committees, such as the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

The preceding suggestions might be means, admittedly mechanical, for engendering the President's interest in the GAC. On the other hand, some commentators have stressed that devices such as these could become merely empty gestures.

Periodic reports, some have objected, containing trivia or matters not of prime importance, could diminish the impact of the GAC. The latter should make recommendations only when it has something of significance to say. That might be often or seldom but it should not demean itself by pushing small or insignificant matters.

In the last analysis, a meaningful communication between the committee on the one hand and the President and his officials on the other depends more on the influential characters of the former and on the real desire of the latter to pay attention to the committee. It would

seem that if the GAC has impressive stature and if it has something worthwhile to say and says it, then it would be difficult for the President to ignore it, and in some cases he might have a real urge to hear what it has to say. One commentator, who had held a top department office, noted that when a committee has high caliber membership, it would be difficult to ignore any comment it made regarding some danger or insufficiency in a matter before the Government. An observation was also made by a former high official that advisory committees like the GAC can sometimes bring fresh perspectives to an issue that simply cannot be cold-shouldered.

D. Access to Information

Obtaining information from executive officials, either by briefings or through less personal channels, has not on the whole been difficult for the GAC nor has denial of such access been a matter of complaint from the GAC. One bleak period already mentioned was the latter part of the first Nixon term. On the whole, the GAC has been successful in keeping abreast of significant information regarding defense, arms control policy and negotiations, intelligence on foreign countries, and other relevant matters. The committee could have been stultified without receiving from unfettered sources the information it has needed.

It is significant that the GAC has been the only group of nongovernmental people granted comprehensive access to classified information regarding important arms control policy matters and negotiations.[24] It was stressed by some commentators that one of the main attractions for people outside of the Government to serve on the GAC has been the valuable opportunity it provides them to obtain knowledge and insights into national security matters which are denied to the public. In a number of instances the information provided the GAC has had special classifications for which many Government officials have not had a clearance.

[24] A possible exception are advisory bodies in the defense area, but these are only tangentially concerned with arms control. Note also that some U.S. Government contractors are given extensive classified information on the subjects on which they have contracted to do research, but such information is limited to those subjects.

Chapter VI

THE WORK OF THE GAC

A. Early Years

Since the work of the GAC was, and remains, classified no official information has been published on recommendations it has made to the President. However, there have been a few unofficial reports regarding some of its recommendations on important international arms control negotiations.

During the early years, although McCloy had much influence with the Kennedy White House, the GAC did not have much of a range of action beyond the Director of ACDA. Allegedly it made some recommendations, for instance, on nuclear test ban negotiations that were significant. In another instance, the committee supported U.S. ratification of the Geneva Protocol prohibiting use of chemical weapons. It helped to stimulate official action on this treaty.

After its decline in the Johnson era the GAC rose to heights of activity and positive attempts to influence policy during the first Nixon administration which have probably not been equalled since.

B. The MIRV Incident

In one noteworthy instance, as reported in the press, the GAC made certain recommendations for the SALT negotiations then in a sensitive stage in 1970 which became a minor *cause celebre*. It is the only time in the history of the GAC in which a serious leak occurred regarding its recommendations. It seems to have come from outside the committee, probably from a faction in the administration which thought it would help bolster its case against a contending faction. In April of that year the press reported [25] that the GAC recommended a moratorium on deployment of offensive and defensive strategic missiles while the United States-Soviet negotiations were in progress aiming at formal agreements to control strategic weapons. The moratorium would have included a halt in the testing of MIRV warheads in the development of which the United States was then ahead of the Soviet Union. At that time the issue of controlling MIRV warheads was a controversial one in the ranks of U.S. policymakers. There were strong pressures to retain the U.S. advantage. The United States officially proposed a ban on MIRVs but with on-site inspection, unacceptable to the Soviets. Later in 1970, according to more leaked press reports,[26] the GAC proposed to the President a ban in the testing and deployment of MIRV warheads without any obligation of on-site inspection.

[25] New York Times, April 7, 1970, pp. 1 and 6.
[26] New York Times, January 29, 1971, p. 3.

By that time the United States had already decided to drop proposals to restrict MIRV warheads. Ironically, the committee's warning that without the restrictions it recommended the strategic balance could be upset has come true. The Soviet Union's development of MIRV warheads since that time has resulted in a serious threat to the survival of U.S. ICBMs.

C. Eclipse of the Committee

Although the President actively sought advice from the GAC early in the SALT negotiations (1969–1970) it appears that, as time went on and these negotiations became more involved and progressed toward agreement, the GAC's advice was no longer sought and probably had diminishing impact on those few officials at the top who were formulating U.S. policy. The efforts of the GAC in the policy arena brought it into contention with the National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, who was the center of arms control policy formulation at that time. Resistance to the overtures of the GAC was manifest in the fact that significant policy and negotiating documents were forbidden to it, thus crippling its ability to make meaningful recommendations. Within the committee discouragement grew and its membership shrank. The fervor of the GAC might not have been so resented if its recommendations had been generally supportive of administration policy. But it was presenting alternative ideas that were out of harmony with the official line.

The character of the candidates nominated by President Nixon for the vacancies on the GAC in 1971 and 1972 with their particular viewpoints in regard to arms control and defense matters suggest that the President was no longer seeking a broad range of opinions and independence of thinking by the members of the committee. It appears that by 1972 the GAC had little if any effect on negotiations. It is now known that negotiations at that time on SALT were so closely held within the National Security Council that the chief negotiator himself, Ambassador Gerard Smith, did not know of highly secret negotiations being conducted in "back channels" by Henry Kissinger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs. Once the SALT I agreements were concluded in May 1972 and were ratified later that year, and once President Nixon was reelected, the GAC became relatively submerged for several years.

During the committee's life under President Ford it took what has been described as a "long view" in arms control matters. It avoided current problems and did not make recommendations, such as it had under McCloy, that were not welcomed by Kissinger and the President.

As noted above, the GAC enjoyed a resumption of Executive attention under the chairmanship of Thomas Watson when Jimmy Carter was President. Among others, it allegedly made certain noteworthy recommendations on deployment of the MX ICBM.

Chapter VII

RELATIONS WITH THE PUBLIC AND WITH CONGRESS

A. Privacy of Activities

From the beginning the GAC has conducted its business in strict privacy. It has not gone public in any way in regard to its recommendations, its information gathering activities or its relationships with Congress. There is nothing in the legislative mandate of the GAC that requires its activities to be private. Under the terms of the Federal Advisory Committee Act there is a general rule that the activities of governmental advisory committees should be open to the public. In many, if not in most, instances this might be a salutary and desirable requirement. However, the FACA also provides that in various cases, including those in which classified information is involved in the work of the organization, the meetings of an advisory committee can be kept closed to the public. From the beginning the GAC has consistently kept its meetings closed and, after the FACA became law in 1972, it continued to close its meetings according to the terms of that law.

There have been discussions within the GAC regarding the possibility that it might go public with its recommendations or perhaps other activities, for example, by holding public hearings, but the decision has consistently been that this could prejudice its function as an advisory committee. The rationale for this position has been twofold. First, any kind of public posture could compromise its relationship with the President. If the public recommendations of the GAC coincided with the President's policy, an impression could be given that it was bowing to the wishes of the President merely because the members of the committee were his appointees. On the other hand, if the GAC went public with recommendations or positions that diverged from those of the President or his administration, then it could be difficult for the President or the administration to give them a fair and unprejudiced hearing for fear that they might appear to be under the influence of the GAC. But if the communications between the GAC and the President and other policy officials are kept private, then there could be no obstacle to weighing the GAC proposals without concern for public appearances.

A second reason for keeping its activities private was that the GAC wished to create no barriers to its free access to classified information. Any public activity could create a risk that such information might be inadvertently compromised. If this happened, it could erect a barrier to the availability of such information to the committee.

In only one case was there a notable compromise of the recommendations of the GAC. This was the occurrence described earlier when its position on the subject of MIRVing U.S. strategic missiles in the SALT negotiations was leaked to the press. There have been no recorded compromises of classified information given to the GAC.

One of the provisions of the FACA is that an advisory committee which holds closed sessions is in any case required to issue a report annually summarizing its activities. The GAC has generally done this, although it evidently has not issued any report covering its activities for the year 1980. It had no activities in the year 1981.

One of the provisions of the proposal by Senator Sam Nunn for enhancing the role of the GAC is that it should keep the public informed of the policy objectives of the United States on arms control and disarmament. This proposal would entail a new departure in the work of the committee but its desirability obviously would have to be weighed in the context of the new role he proposed for the committee. Similar considerations would also exist for any new commission that might be established, such as that proposed by Thomas Watson.[27]

B. Relations With Congress

The idea for the GAC originated with Congress and was approved by Congress in the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961. The relations between the committee and the Congress have generally been low key. On a few occasions individual Members of Congress, including Senator Henry Jackson and Representative Clement Zablocki, have met with the GAC. Otherwise meetings between members of the committee and Members of Congress have been on a one-to-one basis and have been private. Such meetings have generally been thought beneficial. If it is assumed that the GAC will continue in much the same kind of role that it has up to the present, there is a consensus among commentators that there is nothing to be lost, indeed there are positive advantages, in meetings between Members of Congress and the GAC, either as a group or with individual Members of Congress on a private basis.

There is no instance in which either the chairman or a member of the GAC has testified publicly to a congressional committee as a representative of the GAC.

At one time, as described earlier in this paper, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee refused to approve the nominations of several people nominated by the President for membership on the GAC. Senator William Fulbright, who was then the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, opposed them because of a "matter of principle," as he explained it to the Senate. As indicated earlier, the belief was widespread that he did not think that their views on arms control qualified them for membership on the committee at that time. Observers believed that the Nixon Administration was trying to increase the number of people on the GAC more amicable toward its views. This was an isolated incident, but it shows that the Senate can balk if it thinks Executive nominations are out of line.

One proposal that has surfaced is that the GAC might make reports to the Congress from time to time. The proposal does not specify

[27] See Chapter VIII.

whether these should be public or private. Reaction to this kind of proposal has been mixed.

Those who might support some kind of public transmittal of the GAC's recommendations to Congress, perhaps just on a selected basis, are motivated by the possibility of gaining more support for a recommendation that might have been unwelcome in the executive branch. Reports to Congress could give the GAC more of an independent status. Others, however, are firmly convinced that any public role by the GAC in trying to win support from Congress would largely destroy the committee's potentiality as a helpful source of advice to the President and other Executive officials. Moreover, some kind of public role for the GAC in Congress could also be read as a threat to the confidentiality of the classified information now available to the GAC. One reaction to the idea of making reports to Congress, even if they were confidential, is that this would be tantamount to going public by the GAC, because there could be pressure to make them public. Furthermore, there could be limited utility in a report to Congress that was confidential. On the other hand, there was some opinion that a legislative requirement for making confidential reports to Congress would not be harmful because members of the GAC are in contact with Congress from time to time anyway.

One of the problems that the privacy of the GAC's activities causes in its relationship with Congress is that it is difficult for the latter, in exercising its oversight activities under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, to get a good grasp of the value of the committee in order to determine whether its legislative authorization should continue. At one time the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sought to have staff personnel attend confidential meetings of advisory committees under its jurisdiction but did not succeed because the State Department denied such access on the grounds that they were members of the public.[28] An effort to explain that officials of the legislative branch are members of the U.S. Government and not of the public, did not avail. At that time a suggestion was made that the FACA might be amended to permit representatives of oversight congressional committees to attend all meetings of advisory committees as observers. At the present time consideration might be given to amending the Arms Control and Disarmament Act to permit representatives of the oversight committees to attend closed GAC meetings as observers under appropriate safeguards.

C. Public Support of Administration Policies

One of the thoughts that has been discussed by members of the GAC and others is that it might play a public role on behalf of an administration in gaining support for its arms control policies and international agreements. This, in effect, would change the function of the GAC more to that of a public relations, or political lobbying organization. If this were adopted as a leading mission of the GAC then one result might be the appointment to it of persons who are skilled

[28] The attempt was made through the Congressional Research Service in 1973. See Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and House Committee on International Relations, The Role of Advisory Committees in U.S. Foreign Policy, 1975 (Committee Print), pp. 11–12.

in this kind of work or who could be effective in fulfilling this kind of mission. This would also assume, at least to some extent, that these individuals would be supporters of the President's policies. By definition, this would preempt their ability to provide him with the broad spectrum of advice which the GAC might otherwise offer.

If, however, one assumes that the character of the GAC should be substantially altered in order to make one of its principal duties a public educational mission, this could have an impact on its other functions. Indeed, the FACA assumes that advisory committees usually operate as public bodies. Many have made public recommendations on policy issues or legislation. If the GAC were given a public mission, there could be little objection, in fact it could be highly appropriate, for the GAC to carry on an active open relationship with the Congress. On the other hand, if Congress perceived the GAC merely as a lobbying organ of the executive branch trying to sell ideas, agreements or legislation to the legislative branch, then the latter might consider this inappropriate and ignore or abolish it.

Chapter VIII

PROPOSALS

Several proposals have been made for the purpose of improving the performance of Government in the national security area by the employment of advisory committees. One is directed at enhancing the functions of the existing General Advisory Committee. Others advocate new advisory bodies. However, because these could overlap the GAC they pose a question whether they should be considered as replacements for the GAC.

A. Senator Nunn's Proposal to Strengthen the GAC

Senator Sam Nunn's proposal [29] is based on a profound concern that U.S. arms control policy has not achieved its objectives, is poorly understood and weakly supported on a bipartisan basis by the Government and public, lacks coherence, consistency and constancy, and does not have strong leadership. For instance, in recent years three arms control treaties have been concluded but not ratified by the United States and in current negotiations there is an unrealistic separation between tactical and strategic weapons. Of overarching significance is the necessity to place arms control policy in the framework of national strategy and defense policy.

Finally, a dominant weakness in U.S. policy is lack of continuity. For example, the Soviets keep essentially the same negotiators while the United States changes them many times. Moreover, in the United States major shifts in arms control policy can occur with changes in administration. It is obvious that a drastic shift in policy occurred when the Reagan Administration came into office and Senator Nunn feels the U.S. Government is not now doing the job on arms control that it should be.

One way to remedy such deficiencies, he contends, is to "up-grade" the General Advisory Committee, now just an adjunct of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to a "Presidential commission" which would be bipartisan and a "board of directors" for U.S. arms control efforts.

It would be appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, for "overlapping" terms, and it would report to the President.

This commission would consider arms control matters within a framework of national security and foreign policy. More specifically it would:

[29] Washington Post, November 12, 1981. The text is given in Appendix D.

(1) Help formulate and keep the American public informed about arms control objectives and priorities in a non-partisan way and consistent with defense and national security policies;

(2) Monitor negotiations.

What these functions would mean in practice has not been elaborated by the Senator. Furthermore, he has not developed such specifics as how often the commission would meet or what kind of staff it might have. The Senator believes that details can be worked out later.

According to the proposal the commission would be "Presidential," appointed by the President and reporting to the President. The Senator maintains that the commission should not be identified with ACDA because the latter does not possess sufficient standing and prestige. The commission would be independent. The clout necessary to carry out its assigned tasks would be derived mostly from the prestige, credentials and credibility of its members. It could come into conflict with existing Government agencies but, if so, this would be an ineluctable result of the commission's functions.

A key feature of the commission would be the overlapping terms of its members. This would free the commission from the effects of a complete turnover of members every time a new President was elected. It would not only help to give the commission continuity but would also reinforce its independence.

It is difficult to understand how the commission's function of informing the public of U.S. arms control policy and priorities could be officially authoritative. Only Government officials can be authoritative voices for U.S. arms control policy, and in the real world these cannot be guaranteed to be free of partisanship. Obviously an independent commission could disseminate its own version of what U.S. policy should be with whatever persuasive force it possessed.

Many features of the Nunn commission resemble those of the U.S. Senate—and a question has been raised why the Senate could not perform the functions he outlines for the commission. However, Senator Nunn does not contemplate that the commission should supersede the constitutional prerogatives of the executive and legislative branches. Moreover he does not think that the Senate could perform the functions in the way he envisions.

B. Proposal by Senator Fulbright

The Honorable J. William Fulbright, former Senator and Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has suggested that because of growing complications in foreign policy and dangers of mistakes in U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, a body should be established to "bring together in one place the best minds and best judgments" to deal with critical foreign policy problems. Other descriptions he used: "something in the nature of a super-planning Council, a Council of Statesmen, a body somewhat like the Supreme Court, but with advisory rather than legal authority, perhaps a Presidential Commission on United States-Soviet Relations."

This body would consider problems in United States-Soviet relations, presumably including arms control, submitted to it by either the

President or Congress. Qualities it should possess would include the following:

(1) experience by previous service or study.
(2) no aspiration for public office.
(3) non-partisan.
(4) independence.
(5) freedom to make public its views and issues.
(6) support by a small staff.

While this body would not have legal authority, its "influence would depend on the caliber and standing of its members and the compelling nature of their advice." [30]

Subsequently, Senator Fulbright suggested an advisory panel similar to that in his earlier recommendation to give advice on foreign policy.[31] But it would have an essential difference. It "could be selected and funded by a nonpolitical organization such as a public foundation." He suggested that perhaps news media and educational institutions might sponsor the panel.

The aim of this panel would be to "restore a sense of purpose and of confidence in our ability to manage our foreign affairs effectively."

C. The Watson Proposal

A Commission on National Security, proposed by Thomas J. Watson, Jr., former chairman of the GAC, would be a newly established body with broad jurisdiction in the area of national security affairs.[32] It would deal not only with security problems in various regions of the world but would also keep close track of many security issues of a general nature, including such matters as national defense and arms control. Although Mr. Watson does not conceive of his commission as an enhancement of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, he concedes that it could in part, duplicate its functions.

His proposal is driven urgently by the belief that drastic measures must be adopted to deal with the monumental threat from uncontrolled nuclear weapons possessed in vast numbers by the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries. This threat is intensified by the prospect that nuclear weapons capabilities will spread to additional countries.

Mr. Watson's proposal calls for full-time membership on the commission for a number of years. In his proposal at Brown University Mr. Watson suggested 10 years as the term for the full-time members. Subsequently, he suggested the possibility of 8 years as an example of the period he has in mind. Not only does he conceive that the members would serve full-time for a relatively long period but also that they would be completely divorced from conflicting pursuits and would abjure future aspirations to political office. The purpose would be that, in a sense, they would be above politics and would not be wedded to any special interests. He has referred to them as a "Su-

[30] U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Perceptions: Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union. GPO. 1979, pp. 44 ff.
[31] New York Times, April 6, 1980.
[32] Mr. Watson is former chairman of the Board of IBM and U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union. A text of his proposal as made in a speech at Brown University is in Appendix E.

preme Court." By this he evidently means that they would be experienced and respected individuals in their profession who have cut themselves off from all interests, personal or otherwise, which might influence or detract from their sole dedication to the highest welfare of the Nation. Government officials from the President on down would be morally constrained to give careful attention to their advice.

One commentator, at least, has criticized this aspect of the proposal as being too idealistic. It is unrealistic, in this view, to expect that many Americans of the caliber Watson has in mind would be willing to devote long stretches of their lives full-time to the advisory kind of organization he advocates. On the other hand, if a less ambitious version of this proposal were adopted so that the highest standards in selection of members could be reconciled with reasonable tenure on a part-time basis, which was not so demanding of the incumbents, then this might be more practical.

A crucial question in regard to the commission proposed by Mr. Watson is whether it would compete with or duplicate existing organs of Government. Mr. Watson concedes that it might but he thinks that this is justified because he believes that the existing organs of Government, no matter whether in the executive or legislative branches, have not dealt effectively with pressing security threats to the Nation, especially in regard to reaching the proper kinds of negotiated controls over nuclear weapons. However, the organization which he advocates would have no decision-making authority nor would it replace those bodies which derive their legal authority and their power from the Constitution of the United States. This body might advise the Government of the United States to take various initiatives in regard to negotiating international controls over nuclear weapons. It would not have, however, any authority to carry on negotiations itself or to conclude or implement any agreements. But presumably its voice would have such persuasive weight that Government officials, because of the supporting pressure of public opinion, would have to give its recommendations serious attention.

Mr. Watson does not make any suggestions regarding the salaries of the individuals who would serve for long periods on a full-time basis on the commission. Justices of the Supreme Court, to which he compares his commission, receive salaries in the $90,000 per year range. Heads of Federal departments receive annual salaries on the order of $70,000 per year. A question exists whether the regulations currently in effect for individuals who serve on part-time advisory committees would allow incomes commensurate with the kind of full-time talent which the Watson proposal would require.

D. Proposal for a National Academy for Public Policy

The proposal for a National Academy for Public Policy, or Public Affairs, as it has also been called, is recent and has not been fleshed out. Flora Lewis, the New York Times columnist, surfaced this porposal a year ago.[33] Reportedly Senator Alan Cranston is working on a congressional charter for such a body but it has not yet been unveiled.

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[33] New York Times, March 13, 1981. She recently repeated it in the Times, January 18, 1982. See text in Appendix F.

It has its own distinctive elements. Like other proposals described in this study, it would be an effort to make continued use for public benefit of distinguished former Government officials. The subject area of its attention would be "public policy" but the proposer speaks entirely of matters relating to foreign policy.

They would be "life members, perhaps by Presidential nomination and election by Congress." They would publicly discuss important national problems but their individual views would stand without arriving at agreed recommendations. While paid for expenses, they would receive no salaries.

The range of discussion by this body is evidently conceived as wide and presumably would at times focus on national arms control and related policies. Whether it might duplicate in a significant way the endeavors of a GAC is not apparent because, for one thing, it would not be an advisory committee. On the other hand, if planning for it matures, it could turn out to be competitive with the GAC.

E. General Observations

The major proposals, that have been made to upgrade or replace the GAC have the following elements. First, they spring from a perception of failures, weaknesses, or omissions in U.S. foreign policy. The deficiencies of most interest in this study are those bearing on arms control, especially nuclear arms control. In general, there has been a failure to achieve effective agreements, or to harmonize agreements with an overall adequate national security policy providing for reliable military defense. The results of these failures are the continuation of a massive threat to national survival from a nuclear war and dangers to national interest from misjudgments in dealing with international issues or military defense.

Second, the perceived deficiencies are of people and Government institutions. The people are, in the first instance, U.S. Government officials, and in the second instance, the American people. The institutions are the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government and the Constitutional rules which govern them.

Third, since the deficiencies cannot be tolerated an effort must be made to correct or compensate for them. To inform and motivate the American people outstanding individuals who have excelled in Government or other service should be mobilized. Since Government institutions are difficult to improve from within, a procedure from the outside must be applied, namely, a new institution which can have an effect within Government without being part of the regular Constitutional machinery.

What are several merits of this approach?

a. It is an innovative and a positive attempt to improve a defective performance. The proposers presumably are more interested in an initiative for improvement than any detailed scheme.

b. It would bring some of the best human resources of the United States, which would otherwise not be systematically utilized, to bear on vital national policy problems.

c. It embodies an approach which can be efficacious and has been proven to be so in various cases in U.S. Government experience when properly employed. (The President's Science Advisory Committee

and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board are examples of advisory committees which have been beneficial when utilized to their best potential.)

What are several disadvantages of this approach?

a. It does not directly address the central problem—getting people into Government with the indispensable talent and firm will to achieve desired objectives, and reforming governmental machinery to make it work to get desired results.

b. The bodies proposed as remedies are essentially limited in power. They have no legal authority to put solutions into operation and must rely on persuasion, moral influence, and power of intellect to get results.

c. In the final analysis the proposed bodies are creatures of the officials and institutions they are intended to assist. Thus their successful utilization depends not so much on their own decisions but on the uncertain decisions of others.

F. Problems of Implementation

Several questions might be answered as an approach is made to a decision on responding to the proposals which have been made.

(a) Is a new committee necessary? Would it suffice to strengthen the current GAC? If so, what improvements should be made?

(b) Which branch should take the initiative to implement a proposal for a new advisory committee? Thus far the interest in the proposals for some new advisory body has been manifest only in the legislative branch.

(c) What are the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act regarding establishment of a new advisory body?

(d) Where in the Government structure might a new committee be situated?

If it were decided to enhance the GAC, even to the point of making it virtually a new committee by amending the terms of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, this would comply with the Federal Advisory Committee Act. If this route were taken, then there would be no net addition to the total number of advisory committees.

If it were decided to establish a new advisory committee by separate legislation the oversight committees are required by the FACA to determine and report "whether the functions of the proposed advisory committee are being or could be performed by one or more agencies or by an advisory committee already in existence, or by enlarging the mandate of an existing advisory committee." The question has been raised whether an advisory committee such as that proposed by Ambassador Watson would not infringe upon or duplicate the functions of the GAC. It would seem that any additional committee which was not a modification of the GAC would need to be clearly differentiated from the GAC in regard to its purposes, especially in regard to the subject area of its activity, or in regard to the audience to which it might be directed.

For instance, any new advisory committee with some large portion of its activity devoted to arms control matters, even though it might also embrace matters other than arms control, might be characterized as duplicative of the GAC. If a proposed advisory committee had a

very broad mandate in the field of U.S. foreign policy with the intent that it would spend most or all of its activity on matters other than arms control, then it might be desirable to establish it as a separate committee, distinct from the GAC.

Whether one decides to strengthen the GAC through the Arms Control and Disarmament Act or create a new advisory committee by separate legislation, the FACA requires that a Federal official be the management officer of an advisory committee. The present officer for the GAC comes from ACDA. This is an anomaly for a committee now officially acting as and reporting as a Presidential advisory committee.

There is weighty opinion among commentators that the GAC or a new committee should not be attached to ACDA because it lacks sufficient stature and prestige. The prevailing indication is to attach it to the White House. The significant alternative there is whether it should be inside or outside the National Security Council framework. If outside that framework it would have direct access to the President without having the National Security Adviser as an intermediary. Inside the NSC framework would place it under the National Security Adviser—who could view it as a rival and try to control it as happened to the GAC at various times. The National Security Adviser is neither confirmed by nor answerable to Congress.

Chapter IX

CONCLUDING REMARKS

One conclusion that can be immediately drawn is that it is impossible for an outside observer to evaluate adequately how useful the GAC has been. An opinion commonly expressed among public servants in the executive and legislative branches who have some awareness of the GAC is that it has not amounted to much, especially since its rise and fall in the first Nixon Administration. That opinion, however, has been formed in the absence of any real knowledge of what the GAC has been doing under its cover of secrecy.

No outsider is able to penetrate the curtain of secrecy which has been a hallmark of the activity of the GAC since its inception. The few glimpses that have been afforded suggest, if a generalization can be made, at least modest impact upon executive policymaking in specific instances. There is no public evidence that the GAC ever made a recommendation that became a significant tenet of U.S. policy or of a U.S. proposal. That, however, is not the main criterion by which it can be judged. Far more significant could be the influence upon thinking exerted in the numerous meetings between the GAC and U.S. Government officials and in the one-to-one encounters between individual GAC members and such officials.

Among the participants in the work of the GAC approached during this study there was concurrence that the committee has been useful. No one recommended its termination. There was some opinion—strong in some cases—that it should be strengthened. One experienced official philosophically cautioned that it was probably inevitable that any committee of this character would have a share of both successes and failures. Therefore, one should not be too disappointed if its achievements are modest.

One of the values of the GAC stressed by some former high Executive officials is that its recommendations can offer them an opportunity to weigh alternative viewpoints that might not have been generated within Government or which, even if on the table, might not have much momentum behind them. Another view expressed within Government circles, which is more narrowly conceived, is that the GAC, even though it is composed of knowledgeable ex-officials as well as other informed persons, really has little to contribute in regard to policymaking in comparison with the elaborate and well-developed National Security Council System, the State and Defense Departments, ACDA and other Government agencies which are involved in directing arms control negotiations.

Truth exists in both observations. What the GAC can contribute could be marginal but, all the same, these contributions could be valuable.

The question of access to the President has been discussed above. Analysts sometimes concentrate on the relationship of the GAC with the President as the key to assessing its usefulness. This, however, can be a false trail. The chances that the President himself will wish to have close communion with an advisory committee like the GAC are slim, and his will is governing. In some instances it is natural that the President might be open to the chairman as an individual, as he might to other individuals on the GAC, but this depends on personal factors. When this happens, as evidently it has happened a few times in the history of the GAC, the committee could have significant influence through these individuals. In fact, one of the main purposes of a committee like the GAC can be to provide an operating base for certain persons who enjoy Presidential contact.

For the most part, the main way the GAC can exercise influence is through administration leaders other than the President, either by way of direct meetings or personal contacts, or through formal communications to the President routed to those leaders. Under present circumstances this is probably the norm to be expected.

The GAC has represented an unusual, indeed, one might say an outstanding collection of expertise on arms control matters which is not constricted by executive branch policy or decisions. It constitutes an independent citizens group which enjoys an unusual advantage insofar as it has access to classified information regarding key arms control policies and negotiations which is not available to people outside the United States Government. It is therefore in a position to offer comment and recommendations on official arms control matters with insights which the general public does not have. The GAC thus represents an informed public interest ready to express itself to Government policymaking officials on the most salient arms control policy issues. No other public interest group possesses these same advantages.

Various proposals for improving the GAC or establishing other bodies that could offer a better alternative have been discussed. There has been no sign that the executive branch has any intention of making proposals to change the law affecting the GAC. Initiatives for change, if they are to be made, will probably have to come from Congress. By legislation Congress can effect some improvements or create new bodies but there is no way it can guarantee by law that a reformed GAC or a new advisory committee would have influence of a substantial character in administration policymaking. The latter depends in vital aspects on intangibles like personal motivations and relationships that can possibly be influenced but not coerced.

APPENDIX A

No Hail, No Farewell

By Louis Heren, 1970

(EXCERPTS, PAGES 264–266)

* * * one night in the fall of 1969, I was invited to Blair House, the president's guest house, to witness the swearing in of the new national advisory council for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

* * * The council was for the most part a branch of the American establishment, and for a brief hour I was reminded again of how the United States has been governed or influenced by a small group of men on intimate, clubby terms with each other. The company included, among others, John McCloy, Dean Rusk, Douglas Dillon, General Lauris Norstad, Llewellyn Thompson, Cyrus Vance, William Foster, Dr. James Killian, Harold Brown, and Kermit Gordon. Between them, they had run Germany, NATO, the State Department, the Treasury Department, the air force, the World Bank, and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and had manned embassies from Paris to Moscow. They had served five presidents in a hundred and one other capacities. They and their like were the dramatis personae of the display of American superpower since the Second World War. They had advised presidents on the deployment of that power around the world, confident that their advice would be heard, and more often than not acted upon. As far as I knew, only one man present had run for public office.

Most of them were getting on, but their advice would be heard for a few more years. They were very much concerned with the strategic arms limitation talks, the first serious attempt to control offensive and defensive nuclear missiles. Some had been involved in the design, procurement, and deployment of these weapons, but they saw no irony in the new situation. There was a determination to do everything possible to prevent another lap in the arms race, but not at the expense of national security. * * *

I thought, over the second martini, that the world had much to thank these men for. They had helped to hold it together for twenty years, and with civilized restraint until Vietnam. The final qualification had long bothered me. I had understood the liberal intellectuals' lack of restraint. That could be explained by the acceptance of American omnipotence and omniscience, and unquestioned faith in impersonal concepts, but these mature men were different. They came from the older universities before the days of centers for strategic studies and had grown up in a more humble world for all the rich

furnishings of their board rooms and law chambers. They had had infinite experience. They were not only ornaments of the American establishment but the flower of American civilization. Perhaps they were too cut off from the campuses and ghettos, the farms and factories, the tenements and suburban housing developments of America. The only one of them who had run for public office was William Scranton, former governor of Pennsylvania and a poor candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 1964. They might have achieved power and influence too easily, although McCloy was fond of recalling that he was born on the wrong side of Market Street in Philadelphia.

APPENDIX B

FOREIGN AFFAIRS REPORT, NOVEMBER 1981

(EXCERPTS, PAGE 6)

"Shunting the 'Hardliners' Aside." That's the way one observer termed the carefully constructed move to place a number of hardline supporters of the Reagan candidacy for President on the General Advisory Committee of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency * * *

The "hardliners" referred to by Rostow's supporters at the White House have all been placed on the General Advisory Committee to the Arms Control Agency. The General Advisory Committee is a part-time, advisory board, which meets irregularly to give advice on arms control matters. The GAC is not in the regular flow of decision-making concerning arms control and has only as much say as Rostow will allow it. Slated to head the GAC is Dr. William van Cleave, who headed the Reagan transition team at the Department of Defense. Van Cleave already has fallen afoul of liberal Senator Charles Percy, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Percy is alleged to be influenced in his anti-van Cleave views by Thomas Watson, former Chairman of IBM and former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, who feels that van Cleave is too much a hardliner. Also slated to serve on the GAC are: William R. Graham, who served on the Reagan Defense transition team; Colin S. Gray, Director of National Security Studies at the Hudson Institute; Roland F. Herbst, another member of the Defense transition team; Frank P. Hoeber, defense analyst; Charles Burton Marshall, defense analyst; Jaime Oaxaca, Vice President of Northrup Corporation, a defense contractor; former Representative Shirley Pettis; John N. Roche, columnist and Professor at Tufts University; former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; Soviet specialist Harriet Fast Scott; former Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Laurence Silberman; and Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, former Chief of Naval Operations. All are known to question the value of the Carter Administration's SALT II Treaty.

APPENDIX C

GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, MEMBERSHIP

Date: President	Chairman	Members													
1962: Kennedy	John J. McCloy	Roger M. Blough	Rev. Edward A. Conway	John Cowles	Trevor Gardner	George B. Kistiakowsky	Robert A. Lovett	Dean Anderson McGee	Ralph E. McGill	George Meany	James A. Perkins	Norman Phleger	Isidor Issac Rabi	Gen. Thomas Dresser White	Herbert Frank York
1963: Kennedy/Johnson	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	Do.
1964: Johnson	do	do	do	do		do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	Do.
1965: Johnson	do	do	do	do		do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	Do.
1966: Johnson	do	do	Gen. Alfred Gruenther	do	Troy V. Post	do	Stephen J. Wright	do	do	do	do	do	do		Do.
1967: Johnson	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	Maurice Neubarger	Do.
1968: Johnson	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	Do.
1969: Nixon	do	I. W. Abel	Dr. Harold Brown	William J. Casey	C. Douglas Dillon	William C. Foster	Kermit Gordon	Dr. James B. Killiam	Gen. Lauria Norstad	Peter G. Peterson	Dr. Jack Ruina	Dean Rusk	William Scranton	Cyrus Vance	Dr. John A. Wheeler.
1970: Nixon	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	Do.
1971: Nixon	do	do	do	do		do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	Do.
1972: Nixon	do	do	do			do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	Do.
1973: Nixon															
1974: Nixon/Ford	Dr. Harold M. Agnew			Gordon Allott	Edward Clark		Lane Kirkland	John A. McCone	Carl Marcy	Joseph Martin, Jr.	Gerard C. Smith				Do.
1975: Ford	do	I. W. Abel	Dr. Harold Brown	do	do	William C. Foster	do	do	do	do	do	Dean Rusk	William Scranton		Do.
1976: Ford	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	James F. Chambers.	Do.
1977: Carter															
1978: Carter	Thomas J. Watson, Jr.	Harold Agnew	McGeorge Bundy	Bert T. Combs	L. Owen Cooper	Paul M. Doty, Jr.	Lane Kirkland	Douglas Fraser	Harry Hugo	Arthur B. Krim	Wolfgang Panofsky	Brent Scowcroft	Margaret Bush Wilson	Jane Cahill Pfeiffer	
1979: Carter	Thomas J. Watson, Jr./McGeorge Bundy	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	
1980: Carter	McGeorge Bundy	do		do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	George W. Segnious III
1981: Reagan															

APPENDIX D

[From the Washington Post, November 12, 1981]

Arms Control: What We Should Do

(By Sam Nunn)

America's arms control goals have been vague and poorly understood by the public. Our tactics have been short-term, and our strategy ambiguous. Our patience at the negotiating table has been short-lived. Our timing has too often been driven by election considerations and our expectations have swung between euphoria and despair.

Three arms control treaties with the Soviet Union have been signed (by presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter) but have not been ratified by the Senate. This may demonstrate that our "separation of powers" is alive and well, but it also raises serious questions as to whether any American president can conclude an arms control treaty any more.

THE SETTING

The United States is now abiding (without formal agreement) by a SALT treaty that President Reagan himself declared "fatally flawed." While awaiting leverage from newly announced but as yet unapproved strategic programs, we are not renegotiating this unratified treaty. Testimony indicates it will be at least the late 1980's before any new strategic programs close the "window of vulnerability" and bring us back to "parity." Several key parts of the recently announced strategic program, which are not yet well-defined, will have major arms control implications.

We are about to begin negotiations with the Soviets on tactical nuclear weapons, an area in which the United States has little leverage and NATO is at a pronounced military disadvantage. These negotiations provide the Soviet Union a considerable opportunity to prevent the long overdue NATO tactical nuclear force modernization. They also create an increasingly unrealistic separation between strategic and theater nuclear weapons and allow the Soviets skillfully to manipulate growing European skepticism of American leadership.

Under these circumstances, should we be puzzled when we look over our shoulder and our allies aren't following our lead? They don't know where we're going. Do we? Whether we like it or not, our arms control efforts and NATO's future are now linked. A clear, consistent arms control approach that enjoys the support of Congress and the American people is a national security imperative.

CONTINUITY

If the American position on arms control is to have more credibility with our allies, our adversaries and the American people, we must bring some continuity to our process for formulating and executing arms control policy and integrating it with military policies. We must develop a clear set of long-term goals, objectives and priorities that can be understood by the public, our allies and, ideally, even our adversaries.

Procedures within our government must be developed to ensure that strategic weapons programs and arms control measures mesh together better. We can no longer separate the two functions, giving civilians the job of controlling arms and the military the job of procuring weapons. U.S. military planners must have a greater input in shaping our arms control objectives so that arms control measures can also be treated as viable instruments for attaining required security objectives.

For more than a decade, the Soviets have had essentially the same people negotiating SALT. During that same period, the United States has had six chief negotiators and the major support staff has been changed many times. Why shouldn't the Soviets be confident they can wait out the Americans? Why shouldn't our allies and our adversaries believe that our patience and our horizons are limited in the arms control arena?

One way to improve arms control continuity would be to upgrade substantially the current General Advisory Committee on Arms Control. The present committee is co-located with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and, rightly or wrongly, is viewed as an adjunct of that agency. We should consider creating a bipartisan presidential commission to be the board of directors for our arms control efforts.

The commission would be appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate for overlapping terms long enough to give it independence and continuity. It could not and should not supersede the constitutional prerogatives of the executive branch to negotiate, and the Senate to ratify, treaties. It could, however, be asked to bring some coherence to our arms control philosophy and implementation. Reporting directly to the president, the board should have a broad charter to consider arms control under the rubric of overall national security and foreign policy.

It could provide a publicly respected review board to:

- Help formulate long- and short-term arms control objectives, goals and priorities consistent with our national security and our defense policies;
- Monitor negotiations; and
- Keep the American public informed of the goals, objectives and priorities of our arms control efforts in a way that can be separated from partisan political considerations. * * *

APPENDIX E

Speech of Thomas J. Watson, Jr., at Brown University, October 16, 1981

(EXCERPTS FROM CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, OCTOBER 19, 1981, PAGES S11622–S11624)

United States-Soviet Relations: Security Begins at Home

I'm pleased to lead off this year's Ogden lecture series because it's devoted to the problems of U.S.-Soviet relations—the most important topic to Americans I can think of. This vital relationship embraces the possibility of the total destruction of American and Soviet societies simultaneously.

While the Soviet Union has been creating the capability to destory our country, we have continued to spend vast resources to improve our ability to destroy them.

Long ago both nations passed the point of sufficiency—the capacity to inflict nearly total annihilation on the other, no matter who attacks first.

Neither country wants war. Yet both countries continue to build more and better weapons, and to maneuver for marginal advantages, as though World War III would be just another episode in mankind's history.

Common sense tells responsible leaders and ordinary citizens alike that the next World War will be the last war for centuries and a total global catastrophe. Why then, do we not address the problem with the urgency and vision it demands? Why do we attempt quick fixes which come back to haunt us? Why do we pretend nuclear war can be won?

Americans certainly find all manner of fault with Soviet policies, most of it justified. I find the relationship difficult in the extreme. But that evades the issue. If the world goes up in flames, it will be no consolation that the few survivors, can put the blame for the disaster on the Russians.

Today, more than ever, national security begins at home. Americans must pull themselves together and create policies that will steer the rest of the world, friend and foe alike, willingly or unwillingly, out of the jungle and down the road towards peace and security.

For several decades now we have fallen short in our effort to do so. Tonight I want to discuss a few of our failures, to draw some conclusions from them, and to offer a proposal for modestly improving the process of establishing our national security policies and priorities.

Although I will focus on mistakes and shortcomings, let me make clear at the outset that I believe our country has also taken great

strides forward since World War II. For instance the bipartisan consensus on such momentous issues as the Marshall Plan, aid to Greece and Turkey, resisting aggression in Korea, and the opening to China.

But the going has been getting tougher here at home. A consensus is hard to come by. Bipartisanship is a rare occurrence. U.S. policy, driven often by political considerations, has begun to wheel and circle, rather than leading the world on a straight path.

We need a means to develop a far-sighted vision of the most important national interests. We must find a way of bringing our wisest and most judicious thinking to the life and death questions affecting the very survival of our country.

Can we square the circle? Can we improve the process without damaging our democratic system?

A critic should keep quiet unless he can suggest a solution, so here's mine. We need a mechanism which helps our leaders and citizenry choose, out of a welter of conflicting views, a clear, consistent national security policy which takes account of complex technology and strategic calculations, meets our long-term national interests, but at the same time is understood and supported by our people. We want the Soviet Politburo's consistency and steadiness of basic philosophy and long-term purpose, but with the responsiveness to popular will possible only in a democracy.

What the President needs in order to make such policy decisions, and what Congress needs to judge his choices properly is informed and judicious advice:

Advice which takes account of but rises above the parochial concerns of those charged with specific aspects of our national security;

Advice which flows from broad concerns for the national good rather than from narrow personal views or private political ambitions;

Advice which looks to the long term rather than to domestic political pressures of the moment, yet reflects the deeper aspirations of Americans and thereby helps create a strong national consensus.

Others have suggested mechanisms for providing that advice. General Maxwell Taylor has long advocated a National Policy Council. Senator William Fulbright proposed that a body be created, somewhat like the Supreme Court but with advisory rather than legal authority, to give advice on U.S.-Soviet relations.

My own suggestion is to create a Commission for National Security Policy along the following lines:

First, its focus ought to be on national security policy broadly defined with principal attention to the Soviet Union as the main problem. It would embrace U.S. weapons procurement and the use of military force as well as political and economic problems. Plans regarding the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, NATO, Japan and China, to name just a few issues, would be examined when appropriate. But the Commission should focus only on those issues which constitute policy watersheds.

Second, the Commission would be large enough, say 10 persons, to provide a good mix without being unwieldy, Commissioners would be appointed for staggered ten-year terms, to assure continuity and independence. Nonrenewable appointments would be made by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Commissioners should be individuals, Democrats and Republicans, of demonstrated ability

and integrity, they should be familiar with national security issues, and well attuned to main streams of American public opinion. They should drop any outside ties and thus should speak only for themselves. The Commission should be treated as a full-time activity, and Commissioners should have no future political ambitions. The Commission should have access to all information available within the Government.

Third, the Commission should have independent status established by legislation, perhaps along the lines of the Civil Rights Commission, and would not be subordinate to either the President or the Congress. Both the President and the Congress could seek the advice of the Commission on matters in its competence, and its recommendations could be issued in classified form if necessary. Split recommendations might emerge, with dissents spelled out if desired. The Commission should also be empowered to render advice even when not asked, if necessary by means of public hearings.

Could such a Commission have made a difference in the past? I believe it could.

It could have gained support for a China policy based on U.S. interests over the long haul.

It would have provided the continuity on the Bay of Pigs planning that might have given the new Kennedy Administration pause, and could have provided balanced backup for the President's task force during the Cuban missile crisis.

It might have added a voice of reason in Vietnam policy discussions.

It could have stood up for long-term concerns versus short-term advantages in the argument over banning MIRVs. It might have added balance on the side of caution during the headiest day of Nixon's detente, and Ford could have leaned on it for advice and support for a policy of sober detente.

It could have eased the Carter transition; helped President Carter cope with the conflict in views among his own advisers; helped to conclude that putting the MX in the desert may have looked good technically, but answered the wrong question.

It could also have given President Reagan a respected and private sounding board for his policy ideas. On one major issue—the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia—it could have raised questions privately which are now being discussed publicly. And once the decision to go ahead with the sale was made the Commission could have helped develop a national concensus.

It could, in the future, help the whole country look carefully at military commitments that might lead to involvement of American troops abroad or to nuclear war, to make sure beforehand that the people and the leaders of our country agree on our national priorities, agree that a given issue or place is worth fighting for, even risking our country for. The Middle East, for example, offers both opportunities and dangers. The Administration and Congress should welcome calm, private advise on those issues from a Commission such as I propose.

APPENDIX F

[From the New York Times, Jan. 18, 1982]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS—THE MEMORY OF MISTAKES

(By Flora Lewis)

Not long ago, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk gave a rare interview. Standing back from the political fray, he mused about the reasons for the Western alliance and reminded Americans about the importance of keeping friends.

It was an example of the valuable light that elder statesmen can offer when the heat of events is driving active participants in public affairs to foolish prattle. And it was a reminder of the wanton wastage that American habits make of hard-earned wisdom.

At about the same time, British political commentator Henry Fairlie was pointing out why the U.S. so seldom sees high officials resign for reasons of policy, a dramatic but sometimes salutary gesture to focus attention on grave issues and to force open debate.

The American system leaves no position for such dissenters in public life. They are obliged to stump the country or fade away. In parliamentary systems such as Britain, they retain their seats and simply move back from the ministerial benches with a chance to argue their views and perhaps return to power if they are persuasively right.

The lack of a respected, organized forum with which to honor distinguished public servants and make continued use of their experience has come to bother many people involved in national affairs. It is particularly poignant when administrations change and the outs are simply out.

The creation of a National Academy for Public Affairs, where debates on urgent questions could bring forth the experienced judgment of people out of power, was proposed in this column early last year. The idea provoked interest. Alan Cranston, the Democratic whip in the Senate, set out to develop it with plans to draft a Congressional charter, and support is growing.

The need to hear disinterested views based on knowledge that comes with having borne responsibility for the country's governance has never been greater. Now, former officials and widely informed legislators can make the occasional speech, grant an interview or write an article when they feel the urge to give voice, but the impact is scattered and unfocused.

In an institution where those to be honored were made life members, perhaps by Presidential nomination and election by Congress, they could meet and discuss urgent or long-term problems face to face, providing the public with an assemblage of views and ideas.

How useful it would be to hear Henry Kissinger, George Ball, Dean Rusk, James Schlesinger, Frank Church, Stuart Symington,

Robert McNamara, to name a few, exchange their arguments on how to shape relations with the Russians or what to do about the Middle East.

The value of an Academy, alongside the institutions of government, would be its power to command attention and persuade. It would not make recommendations, so there would be no need for the trimming and compromising inevitable in a legislative forum. While members would be compensated for their expenses, they would not be paid, so there would be no commercial compulsions of the sort that earn high lecture fees and sell books.

And since all the members would be retired—whether by choice or by the electorate—there would be little urge to tack in the service of ambition. Everyone wouldn't always say wise things, but there would be no reward for being foolish or demagogic.

The qualification would be eminent service, not necessarily success. Stuart Symington used to tell a story about a very successful man who made a fortune when business was bad and everyone else was going broke. Asked how he did it, he said, "good judgment." How did he come by such astute judgment? "Experience," he said. And how did he get such valuable experience? "By making mistakes."

The memory of mistakes, with the understanding it can bring of how how to avoid repeating them, is a precious source of advice in difficult times. That is why many societies revere the aged, though there is an extra advantage in being able to hear them without reserving the right of decision for them.

The effect of Academy debates would be public information. Since respect would be the only prize to be garnered, the only pressure on members would be to speak as lucidly, as knowledgeable, as independently as possible. If people who know about the problems of power from their past responsibilities were to confront each other in that way, the media would make sure that they were heard because their debates would make news.

It isn't really possible for people in government to take the long view of issues and to think well ahead. They are always harassed by immediate questions to be answered quickly.

As we approach the third millennium, the long view of our turbulent world may make the difference for survival. The U.S. needs a distinguished platform to develop it, and to develop a well-informed public consensus that can add the quality of wisdom to decision.

APPENDIX G

President Reagan's Nominations to the GAC

Except where indicated, the following were nominated on May 26, 1982, by President Reagan to be Members of the General Advisory Committee:

William Robert Graham. Upon confirmation, the President intends to designate Dr. Graham to be acting chairman. He is currently serving as defense research analyst, R&D Associates, in Marina del Rey, California.

Colin Spencer Gray. He is President of the National Institute for Public Policy, Virginia.

Ronald F. Herbst. He has been with R&D Associates, Marina del Rey, California, since 1971 and is currently director of the Nuclear Effects Division.

Francis P. Hoeber. Since 1974, he has been president of Hoeber Corporation in Arlington, Virginia.

Robert B. Hotz. He is senior editorial consultant, McGraw-Hill Publications. (Nominated August 12, 1982)

Eli S. Jacobs. He runs his own investment office. (Nominated June 29, 1982)

Charles Burton Marshall. He is serving as consultant to System Planning Corporation in Arlington, Virginia.

James Oaxaca. He is vice president and assistant general manager, Northrop Corporation, Electro-Mechanical Division.

Shirley N. Pettis. She is a member of the board of directors of the Kemper Corporation. She is a member of the board of trustees at the University of Redlands. In addition, she is vice president of the Women's Research and Education Institute in Washington, D.C.

John P. Roche. He is serving as academic dean, and Professor of Civilization and Foreign Affairs at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tuffs University.

Donald Rumsfeld. He is currently president and chief executive officer at G. D. Searle and Company in Skokie, Illinois. He was formerly Secretary of Defense and U.S. Representative to NATO.

Harriet Fast Scott. She is an occasional lecturer at the Army War College, Air University, National War College and the United States Military Academy. She is a consultant on Soviet military and political-military affairs to various government organizations and research institutes. She is a senior research associate at the Advanced International Studies Institute.

Lawrence Hirsch Silberman. He is currently executive vice president (Legal and Government Affairs) of Crocker National Bank in San Francisco. He is also a visiting fellow of the American Enterprise Institute and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He was formerly Ambassador to Yugoslavia.

Elmo Russell Zumwalt, Jr. He is currently serving as president of Admiral Zumwalt and Associates, Inc., a consulting firm in the field of management, energy, health care, overseas business operations, foreign and defense policy, and strategic planning. He was formerly Chief of Naval Operations and a Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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